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The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the contribution of trade 
liberalisation to differences in the level of prosperity across nations. In addition we 
compare this with the relative contribution of institutional capacity to prosperity, as 
well as the role of human capital accumulation in that respect. We employ several 
concepts of institutional quality, trade policy and openness variables following 
various definitions prevalent in the literature. Unlike in the comparable study by 
Rodrik et al. (2004) we have (a) included a role for human capital, (b) employed six 
institutional variables compared to one only in Rodrik et al. (rule of law), (c) included 
trade policy variables, and not just openness indicators and (d) expanded the set of 
openness measures employed. We discover that opening up domestic markets to 
foreign competition by revoking trade restrictions and trade barriers can be good for 
economic performance. Secondly, developing human capital is as important as 
superior institutional functioning for economic wellbeing. Indeed, the accumulation of 
human capital stocks via increased education might lead to improved institutional 
functioning, and the utilisation of policies like trade liberalisation. We find that 
openness counts for little per se in explaining income differences across countries. 
This is because it is an outcome and not a cause. Trade policies, and liberalisation, on 
the other hand, are not insignificant in explaining cross-country per-capita income 
variation. With regard to trade policies we can say that the overall policy stance, 
particularly those associated with black market premia in foreign exchange markets 
and export taxes, are most important in explaining cross-country per-capita income 
differences.  
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In poor low-income nations economic growth constitutes the principal avenue 
for poverty reduction. Redistribution, even when feasible, can never be enough on its 
own to substantially reduce poverty. Thus, there is a close link between growth and 
poverty reduction. Growth, however, may result not just from policies that foster it 
such as trade policy reforms, but because certain nations have superior institutions 
within which the same policy framework is determined and executed. This also raises 
the issue of reverse causality. Higher incomes that are the result of growth in the 
context of well-functioning institutions, in turn also produce superior institutions that 
are a function of increased per-capita income. By institutions we imply factors that 
result in good governance: political stability, voice and accountability, the rule of law, 
the regulatory framework, bureaucratic quality and the control of corruption (see 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 2002 for example). There is little controversy 
over the important role played by both international trade and institutional quality in 
fostering growth. Economic development is, however, a complex phenomenon which 
encompasses a multitude of social, economic, political and scientific phenomenon. 
Accounting for all of these factors in order to explain growth is a difficult task. The 
purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the contribution of trade policy 
changes upon prosperity via its impact on per-capita income level differences across 
nations. Our paper contributes to the debate over the relative role of institutions versus 
trade integration (or policies) in determining relative levels of prosperity across 
countries. In this connection, some authors such as Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
(2004, henceforth Rodrik et al.) claim that institutions dominate all other factors in 
determining income differences across countries; our analysis based on an extension 
of their very own framework is somewhat sceptical of this assertion. In addition, 
following Glaeser et al., (2004 a and b) we try to examine the role of human capital 
accumulation in this process, finding some support for their view that human capital 
can be just as important as institutional quality in determining relative prosperity, and 
may even lead to improved institutional functioning.  
With regard to international trade and its impact on economic well-being, it 
has to be borne in mind that trade can increase or decrease independent of any 
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changes to the trade policy stance (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, export subsidies etc.).
1 
Globalisation, factors that are external to an individual nation, may facilitate trade. 
Technological changes may make certain goods, say imports, cheaper despite the 
presence of trade restrictions. Similarly, a fall in transportation costs or the end of war 
may alter the relative price of tradables encouraging more international trade. Trade 
may increase income, but changes in trade policies may not foster more international 
trade and hence not contribute to growth or poverty reduction. In short, we have to 
distinguish between openness, some thing that is an outcome of policy choices or 
serendipity; and trade policies aimed at promoting greater international trade which 
might or might not succeed. We make this important distinction in the empirical work 
that follows, unlike most authors including Rodrik et al. (2004).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a review of 
the literature covering the debate regarding the alternative impact of trade policy or 
openness on growth, with some authors establishing a direct link between openness 
and growth, whilst others emphasise the role of good institutions. Sections 3 (data and 
methodology) and 4 (regression analysis) contain our contribution to the debate. Our 
analysis, although similar to Rodrik et al. (2004), goes beyond their work by including 
more institutional measures, openness indicators, as well as explicit trade policy 
variables and a role for human capital. Therein lies the innovation of our paper. 
Finally, section 5 concludes with some policy implications. 
 
 
2  KEY DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: TRADE 
POLICY/OPENNESS, INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
Where do the fundamental and deep determinants of growth lie? Apart from 
the effort required in savings or capital accumulation, do the fundamental 
determinants of growth lie in policies such as trade policy or human capital 
accumulation or is growth fostered by good institutions? In an influential paper, Sachs 
and Warner (1995) argued that countries that were more open (based upon a number 
of openness indicators) grew faster than countries that were not open, hence creating 
pre-conditions for poverty reduction. A country was classified as not open based upon 
                                                 
1 By trade policy we mean governmentally induced mechanisms that restrict, relax or facilitate the 
international exchange of certain or all goods and services.  
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  violation of any of the indicators. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), however, have 
convincingly argued that the Sachs and Warner (1995) study suffered from sample 
selection bias and that some openness indicators could be highly correlated with other 
indicators of good governance or institutional quality. As an example of the first 
problem, countries in sub-Saharan Africa failed to be counted as open as most of them 
had state monopolies controlling the export trade. This is not true because “open” 
economies as defined by Sachs and Warner (1995) such as Indonesia also had state 
monopolies in petroleum for example. Secondly, another indicator of the lack of 
openness, a black market premium on the exchange rate could be highly related to 
institutional quality (corruption, regulatory capacity). Most damaging of the 
Rodriguez and Rodrik critique of Sachs and Warner’s assertion that openness 
promotes growth lies in the fact that an Africa dummy variable capturing the special 
effect of Africa on cross-national growth could be substituted for the two crucial 
openness indicators that contributed significantly to growth. 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) went on to review some of the key cross-
national empirical literature on the relationship between trade policy and economic 
growth and conclude that there is little evidence that open trade policies, in the sense 
of lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, are significantly associated with 
economic growth. The theory on this relationship, in the case of a small economy that 
takes world prices of tradable goods as given, would predict that: (1) in static models 
with no market imperfections and other pre-existing distortions, the effect of a trade 
restriction is to reduce the level of real GDP at world prices. In the presence of market 
failures such as externalities, trade restrictions may increase real GDP (although they 
are hardly ever the first-best means of doing so); (2) in standard models with 
exogenous technological change and diminishing returns to reproducible factors of 
production, a trade restriction has no effect on the long-run (steady-state). 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) have evaluated the role of institutions and 
international trade in economic development. They provide evidence that countries 
with better institutions and nations that trade more grow faster. However, they have 
concluded that it is trade which matters more in this nexus as a short term pro-growth 
strategy, institutions featuring more prominently in the long-run. But this conclusion 
is rejected by Rodrik et al. (2004), who find that the quality of institutions ‘trumps 
every thing else’. They conclude that when institutions are controlled for, the 
measures of integration have at best insignificant effects on the level of per-capita 
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income. However, not all institutions matter equally. Democracy may not always 
contribute to growth, as has been the case in rapidly growing nations such as China 
and Singapore, see Barro (1996). There is also the issue of human capital and its place 
in fostering growth, and even aiding the formation of superior institutions. Glaeser et 
al. (2004a) bring forth an important missing link to the debate by suggesting that 
human capital is more important for growth than are institutions. In fact, they go a 
step further by suggesting that human capital actually contributes to institutional 
improvement. Their paper presents the view point that the growth potential of 
developing countries depends more on the leadership qualities (good or bad 
dictatorships) rather than institutional quality. 
On the importance of human capital vis-à-vis growth, Schiff (1999), after 
reviewing recent empirical studies on the subject concludes that poor countries can 
only grow faster than rich countries if their initial stock of human capital exceeds the 
average level among other poor nations. For example, when East Asian and South 
Asian economies are compared, differences in human capital and differences in the 
convergence level seem to move together. For instance, East Asian Developing 
countries witnessed unprecedented increases in GNP per capita over the last three 
decades; 10 times for Malaysia, 65 times for Republic of Korea and 13 times for 
Thailand. During the same period, Asian least developed countries (Bhutan, 
Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic) and South Asian developing 
countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) saw only a meagre increase in average 
income of between 2 and a little over 5 times.  
It is intriguing to note that in 1960s when most of these countries were at 
similar stages of economic development, East Asian developing countries were far 
ahead of both Asian least developed countries and South Asian developing countries 
in human capital. In fact, the total literacy rates for East Asian developing countries in 
the 1960s were as high as 71 percent for the Republic of Korea, 68 percent for 
Thailand and even Malaysia had a rate of over 50 percent. On the other hand, in case 
of all Asian least developed countries and South Asian developing countries, the total 
literacy rates were as low as only 9 percent for Nepal and 15 percent for Pakistan, 
with Cambodia having 38 percent literacy.  
After three decades, while Asian least developed countries and South Asian 
developing countries have some what augmented their human capital stocks, the total 
literacy rates are still far below 50 percent in the cases of Bangladesh, Nepal and 
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Pakistan. During the same period, however, East Asian developing countries have 
more or less achieved the formidable task of educating most of their people. As a 
result, in the late 1990s, the total literacy rate of the Republic of Korea had reached 98 
percent, and Malaysia managed to achieve a rate of about 90 percent. In short, 
economic progress in East Asia during the 1980s may have occurred because of their 
well developed human capital endowment which gathered momentum in the 1960s or 
earlier.  
Figure 1 elaborates how the inter-relationship between growth, institutions, 
human capital and trade works. Any analysis, which attempts to capture the effects of 
institutions and openness on prosperity, is fraught with the problems of endogeneity 
and reverse causation. For example richer and more developed countries have better 
institutions and they are more liberalised with regard to trade than more 
underdeveloped nations. So a pertinent question can be raised as to whether affluent 
countries are rich because they are more open and have better institutions or does this 
relationship work in reverse? There is also a debate as to whether better institutions 
encourage trade, or if it is openness and liberalisation that cause institutional 
improvement. There is some evidence to suggest that both possibilities exist (see for 
example: Anderson and Mercuiller, 1999; and Wei, 2000). “The extent to which an 
economy is integrated with the rest of the world and the quality of its institutions are 
both endogenous, shaped potentially not just by each other but also by income levels.  
Problems of endogeneity and reverse causality plague any empirical researcher trying 
to make sense of relationship among these causal factors (Rodrik et al., 2004:2).” 
Similarly human capital is also endogenous as it affects institutions as well as 
openness. Countries with higher levels of human capital are also the ones which have 
better institutions. Lipset (1960) suggests that high levels of human capital resulting 
from education leads to more benign politics, less violence and more political 
stability. Similarly, nations that grow faster have more resources at their disposal to 
improve human capital levels. Generally rich countries have a much higher level of 
human development than less developed countries. Furthermore, if more open 
economies are the countries that are more affluent, then not only growth but openness 
too may be the product of human capital formation.  
Figure 1 
Reversal causality between income, institutions, integration and human capital 
  5 
 
                                                   
   INCOME 






                                  














3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
In the light of the above debate our model includes many of the core 
determinants of growth, namely international economic integration (including 
measures of openness and trade policy), measures of institutional quality, physical and 
human capital.  In fact, our dependent variable is not growth per se, but the log of 
income per-capita, as in Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004).   
Differences in per-capita income across countries are, of course, often a result of 
differential growth rates in the past. Here we follow the practice in Easterly and 
Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) where the relative contribution of policies and 
institutions in explaining per-capita income differentials is tested. Our sample 
includes both rich OECD countries and developing countries.  As regards “policy”, 
we examine the effect of both openness, as in Rodrik et al. (2004), as well as trade 
policy variables. Openness indicators are an outcome variable, pointing to the extent 
to which a country trades as a proportion of national income. Trade policy indicators 
are, however, a more direct measure of the policy stance, and this was not examined 
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in Rodrik et al. (2004). We deem these policy variables to be of greater significance in 
a test of the relative efficacy of policy vis-à-vis institutions.   
The final equation to be estimated takes the following form:  
i i i i i i PK HK TP N y ε η γ χ β α + + + + + = log   (1)
The variable  is income per capita in country i, ,  ,  , and  are 
respectively measures for institutions, integration, human capital and physical capital 
and 
i y i N i TP i HK i PK
i ε  is the random error term. Human Capital is represented by average schooling 
years. In order to have an in-depth insight into how institutions or increased 
integration impact on income per-capita, we will employ several concepts of 
institutional quality, trade policy and openness variables following various definitions 
prevalent in the literature. For example, we take into account the six different 
classifications of institutions identified by Kaufman et al. (2002), namely rule of law 
(Rl), political stability (Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), 
voice and accountability (Va) and control of corruption (Ctc).
2 Rodrik et al. (2004) 
only consider the rule of law. On the international economic integration front, we 
have carefully chosen three specific measures of openness. The ratio of nominal 
imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the conventional openness indicator (see 
Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Rose, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 
2002; Rodrik et al., 2004). Two other measures of openness are overall trade 
penetration (tarshov) derived from World Bank’s TARS system and overall import 
penetration (Impnov) respectively (see Rose, 2002). Neither of these measures are 
direct indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only towards the level of its 
participation in international trade. There are indicators of trade restrictiveness acting 
as measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et al., 2001, Rose 2002). 
Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and 
capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import 
charges (Totimpov) can all be considered as good proxies for trade restrictiveness and 
have also been employed in our study. Other measures which capture restrictions in 
overall trade are non-tariff barriers. We use overall non-tariff coverage (Ntarfov) and 
non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owqi) as two proxies for 
                                                 
2 The value of these variables range from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best) for every country in the sample. 
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non-tariff barriers (see Rose, 2002). Moreover there is also a trend in the trade 
literature to use composite measures of trade policy. Edwards (1998) advocates the 
Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (Open80), and Leamer’s openness indicator 
(Leamer 82) as being apposite proxies of openness. We have also used these 
composite measures to examine in detail how openness influences per-capita income. 
In summary our study employs 6 institutional and 11 openness variables in an attempt 
to undertake a comprehensive analysis of how institutional quality and exposure to 
increased international trade affects the economic performance of a country. Unlike in 
the comparable study by Rodrik et al. (2004) we have (a) included a role for human 
capital, (b) employed six institutional variables compared to one only in Rodrik et al. 
(rule of law), (c) included trade policy variables and not just openness indicators and 
(d) expanded the set of openness measures employed.  
Before we undertake the regression analysis it is useful to explore the linear 
dynamics of the relationship between income and our selected determinants of 
economic prosperity or growth. Table 1 (appendix 2) provides pair wise correlations. 
The three openness measures show a weak relationship with income. This is expected 
because openness measures capture overall trade in a country. This makes them weak 
proxies for trade policy as differences in trade shares across countries can have many 
exogenous reasons along with income itself, such as geography and trade policies.                        
On the other hand, the coefficients of our core trade policy variables show that 
a significant linear relationship is present between income and trade restrictiveness. 
The table suggests that any decrease in tariffs and non-tariff barriers has a positive 
impact on per-capita income. Furthermore, institutions and human capital come out to 
be key determinants of economic wellbeing as nearly all of them are significantly 
related to income, see figure A1 and A2 (appendix 1). 
As indicated earlier, there are potential endogeneity problems between per 
capita income and institutions, per-capita income and human capital, as well as 
between openness (or the trade policy stance) and income per-capita. One way of 
cleansing our empirical analysis from endogeneity in explanatory variables and the 
reverse causality between dependent and independent variables is to adopt 
Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques in the context of two stage least squares 
regression analysis (2SLS).  As a first step to run IV regressions we have to find 
appropriate instruments for  our 11 openness/ trade policy variables and 6 institutional 
concepts. The first stage estimation includes instruments for the two explanatory 
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variables with potential endogeneity problems. The regression estimate in the next 
stage utilises the predicted variables of these variables for institutions and trade 
policy/openness in a standard per-capita income or growth regression as in (1).  
The literature clearly establishes that predicted trade shares following Frankel 
and Romer (FR) (1999) from a gravity equation is the most appropriate instrument for 
openness/trade policy. On the other hand, the most compelling institutional instrument 
is the measure of settler mortality suggested by Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001). But the data is only available for 64 countries. Though Rodrik et al. (2004) 
have extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low number when 
compared to another widely used institutional instrument namely ‘fractions of the 
population speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the first 
language (Eurfrac)’ which covers as many as 140 countries. Thus following Dollar 
and Kraay (2002) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use this instrument for our 
institutional proxies. We have employed total public spending on education (as a 
percentage of GDP) and primary public-teacher ratio as two instruments for human 
capital, which is proxied by average years of schooling at age 25. The former 
instrument captures the quality of education and the later instrument captures the 
quantity of education. As in Rodrik et al. (2004), we employ ‘distance from the 
equator’ as a fifth instrument (proxy for geography). This is a purely exogenous 
concept. 
Our IV regression model has three equations, where in the first stage we 
generate predicted values of institutions, openness/ trade policy and human capital 
respectively by regressing them on a set of instruments.  
Ni i i i i i i GEO PTR TLEX FR EUR ENG N ε θ ρ ϖ τ ν φ λ + + + + + + + = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   (2)
 
Ni i i i i i i GEO PTR TLEX FR EUR ENG TP ε θ ρ ϖ τ ν φ λ + + + + + + + = 2 2 2 2 2 2 2   (3)
 
Ni i i i i i i GEO PTR TLEX FR EUR ENG HK ε θ ρ ϖ τ ν φ λ + + + + + + + = 3 3 3 3 3 3 3   (4)
where   and  are our instruments for institutions referring to fractions of 
population speaking English and European languages respectively.   is instrument 
for trade policy. TlEX is total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP 
and PTR is primary public-teacher ratio and both are instruments for human capital. 
i ENG i EUR
i FR
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i GEO  is proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. At the second stage 
the predicted values of respective institutional and openness variables are employed in 




4 REGRESSION  RESULTS 
It would be interesting to know what information our first stage results give us 
regarding the quality of instruments. Table 2 (Appendix 2) suggests that for nearly all 
specifications of openness and institutional quality, the respective instruments carry 
the right signs. In some cases when the instruments carry the wrong signs, they are 
also insignificant. The (FR) instrument is statistically significant for all openness 
variables and 2 out of 6 trade policy variables. Though (FR) is not significant for most 
trade policy variables, there is a strong one to one correlation between trade policy 
and (FR) instrument because the former variable always enters the trade policy 
equation with a right sign.  Similarly ENG and EUR come out as sound instruments 
for institutions as they have generally been significant and always with a right sign. 
Similarly TLEX and PTR establish themselves as good instruments for human capital.  
However, note that for trade taxes (Txtrg) and non tariff barriers (Ntarfov), the signs 
for public spending on education (TLEX) are positive and they are highly significant. 
This suggests that in an effort to integrate more with the world economy, if 
governments decrease their trade restrictiveness, their development expenditure would 
bear the brunt of cuts and they may be compromising their goals in the education 
sector by investing less on education.    
Before proceeding to our second stage regressions, we tried to see how 
predicted values of our openness and institutional variables relate to per-capita income 
in a linear framework. To this effect, figures B1 and B2 (appendix 1) provide 
graphical representations of such linear relationships. It is interesting to note that the 
use of instrumental variables provides a much clearer picture of openness/trade policy 
and institutions with regard to income when compared to results in figures A1 and A2, 
especially for the ones which depict trade restrictiveness and institutions. This re-
establishes the robustness of our instruments for openness/ trade policy and 
institutions.  
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Moving on to the second stage regression analysis, table 3 (appendix 2) 
provides the results for per-capita income equation with combinations of our 11 
openness/trade policy variables with all various institutional concepts under multiple 
specifications. We employ three estimation specifications for our right-hand side 
variables (see appendix 3 for data definitions and details). In specification 1 we 
combine openness or trade policy indicators with institutions as well as human and 
physical capital; specification 2 contains openness or trade policy indicators along 
with institutions and human capital but not physical capital; and specification 3 is the 
Rodrik et al. model with trade policy openness indicators juxtaposed against 
institutions only. We argue that specification 1 is a richer model, as it contains roles 
for human and physical capital in explaining per-capita income differences across 
nations.     
Only for specification 3 (see table 3: appendix 2), which corresponds to the 
specification followed by Rodrik et al. (2004), the results turn out to be similar to their 
study. Institutions clearly trump openness and trade policy as they have been highly 
significant in most cases. In contrast to institutional proxies, openness variables 
generally remained insignificant, and if significant have mostly entered equation 1 
with a wrong sign. Trade policy variables also remained insignificant under 
specification 3 with the exception of trade taxes which are significant in some cases.  
However, for specifications 1 and 2 (see table 3: appendix 2), where human 
capital enters equation 1, the results present a different picture and challenge the 
position taken up by Rodrik et al. (2004) apropos the inconsequential role of trade in 
economic development in the face of stronger institutions. For specification 1 and 2 
institutions are overwhelmingly insignificant. Compared to specification 3, the 
frequency of insignificance for openness reaches nearly 100 percent in specifications 
1 and 2 when human capital is considered. Openness proxies are insignificant, as well 
as having the wrong signs in most cases. The insignificance of openness proxies 
capturing the level of trade or movements in terms of trade is not surprising. These 
results are in accordance with the findings of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik 
(1998), who suggest that the correlation of trade levels and growth performance is at 
best weak in the long run. Our results reinforce this fact in a more comprehensive 
manner, as we have provided additional specifications to the per-capita income 
equation by including human capital and physical capital. Especially, the inclusion of 
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human capital has improved the explanatory power of our model, as is evident from 
higher
2 R values. 
As far as the trade policy variables are concerned, they are significant in some 
cases and the frequency of significance is much higher when compared to openness 
variables. Though trade policy indicators too can have wrong signs, unlike Rodrik et 
al. (2004) and our own analysis, where in many instances openness variables carry 
wrong signs and have also been significant, our trade policy variables which carry 
incorrect signs are generally insignificant.
3 With the exception of Totimpov, other 
trade policy variables always enter equation 1 with right signs whenever they are 
significant.  Tariffs, Owti, Owqi and Ntarov also show wrong signs but in such 
instances they have also been insignificant. In fact, Owqi which has highest frequency 
of wrong signs next to Totimpov, remains insignificant under all specifications and 
with any of the institutional combinations. By contrast, Txtrg which is the most 
significant trade policy variable, always enter the equation with a right (negative) sign 
showing that trade policy does matter and trade restrictiveness indeed lowers per 
capita income or growth. 
It is also important to understand why some trade policy variables have the 
wrong signs or are insignificant, when others have passed the test by emerging as 
significant contributors to economic success. With regard to the insignificance of 
import taxes Totimpov, one can suggest that their contribution depends upon the 
composition of goods imported. For example, for a developing country the availability 
of technologically superior import goods has positive effects on output and growth, 
but if imports are dominated by consumption goods, a reduction in import taxes may 
very well hamper growth potentials, and at a cost to the public exchequer. Rodrik 
(1998) supports this line of argument, as he found that changes in import taxes fail to 
influence growth in Sub Saharan African countries.  According to him it is export 
taxes, which if lowered, contribute to growth. Esfhani (1991), however, provides 
contrary evidence. Similarly Lee (1995) found that there is a significant impact of 
imports on growth suggesting import taxes do matter in affecting growth. Thus in the 
context  of  a  cross sectional study, it is wiser to examine the impact  of  overall  trade 
                                                 
3 This occurs when import protection increases per-capita income.  
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taxes (import and export) instead of looking at any one of them in order to have a 
general insight into the workings of trade taxes apropos economic activity. According 
to Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), overall trade taxes capture trade restrictiveness in a 
more complete manner than any of the other proxies of trade policy as it is comprised 
of both import and export taxes.  
Not surprisingly, Txtrg (overall trade taxes) comes out to be the most 
important trade policy variable since it has been recorded as significant in many 
instances in all the 3 specifications(see table 4: appendix 2). To be exact, Txtrdg is 
significant in 4 out of 6 cases in specification 1, 2 out of 6 cases in specification 2 and 
2 out of 6 cases in specification 3. Note that trade taxes are most significant in 
specification 1, where human and physical capital enters the per capita equation. In 
comparison, the institutional proxies always enter equation 1 as insignificant under 
the same specification. This is again an important result if we compare it with the 
results obtained by Rodrik et al. (2004), where it was openness which was generally 
insignificant and institutions (Rule of Law) have largely been highly significant at 1% 
level of significance. All in all, trade taxes  enter significantly in the per-capita 
equation with voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of 
law and control of corruption making a strong case for the important role trade policy 
plays in economic development.  
We have also included more specific proxies of trade restrictiveness (tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers) in an attempt to identify the optimal trade policy tools for 
policy makers. In table 3 Owti (tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods) and 
Owqi  (non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods) have been 
insignificant under all specifications of our per-capita income equation and with any 
of the institutional combinations. Though we find Ntarfov (overall non-tariff barriers) 
significant for specification 3 when it enters the equation with rule of law, it does not 
say much about the role of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), as Ntarfov remains 
insignificant for the other five institutional proxies under the same specification. The 
insignificance of TB and NTBs does come as a surprise. Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
share this scepticism over the relevance of these measures of trade policy with the 
likes of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Frankel and Romer (1999). Perhaps this is 
the reason why trade policy variables are virtually absent in the recent empirical 
debate over trade and institutions. For example, Frankel and Romer (1999), 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Alcala and Ciccone (2002), Dollar and 
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Kraay (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2004) all have tried to find partial effects of trade and 
institutions on per-capita income or its growth by taking into account the general 
openness indicator (trade over GDP ratio) only.  
There are many studies which have tried to capture the effects of trade policy 
on economic development: Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) and 
Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) are among the prominent studies which have 
employed direct proxies of trade policies. They confirm that the countries with policy-
induced barriers to international trade grow at a slower pace. Notwithstanding the 
important role of these studies in providing useful insights into the ‘trade and growth’ 
debate, they have two shortcomings. First, in the light of recent evidence provided by 
Rodrik et al. (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2002), their studies are likely to suffer 
from misspecification bias as they have not taken account of institutions in their 
growth equations. Secondly, they have assumed trade policy to be purely exogenous.  
Wood (2004), commenting on the ‘trade and growth’ debate, not only 
emphasised that a more convincing basis for trade policy recommendations could only 
be provided if trade policy variables are included in the regressions, but also pointed 
out that any such attempt should consider trade policy as an endogenous concept as no 
trade policy recommendations can be given without taking second best effects into 
account. This is because trade policies crucially depend on the functioning of 
domestic markets of any particular country, and if these are imperfect, second best 
considerations enter the picture. 
To this effect we have somewhat addressed the endogeneity of trade policy 
variables by regressing them on a set of instruments. Though the instruments remain 
very general in nature they do capture certain country specific characteristics. And as 
our per-capita income equation has institutional proxies and human capital along with 
trade policy variables, our analysis goes a step further from previous cross sectional 
studies which have attempted to gauge the effects of trade policy on economic 
development. 
Although some of our trade policy variables are insignificant, we do get 
certain trade proxies which show that trade policy does matter in determining 
economic prosperity. The importance of any such cases is self evident because we not 
only dealt with trade policy as an endogenous concept but we have also included 
institutions and human capital in our per-capita income determining equation, so as to 
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avoid the misspecification bias which cross section studies including the recent ones 
by Rodrik et al. (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2002) suffers from. 
Overall, the results suggest that the general openness variables fail to explain 
per-capita income differences compared to direct proxies of the trade policy stance. 
For example, lcopen, Impnov and Tarshov have been found insignificant in all our 
specifications, suggesting their weak relationship with income. By contrast, our 
results suggest that decreases in overall trade taxes are associated with strong 
improvements in economic performance.  
We also employ composite measures of openness that are really indices of the 
trade policy stance, as well as measures based on residuals, regressed with the six 
institutional concepts. Again we find that institutions, though significant in many 
instances, are not the most significant factor in determining per-capita income 
differences. Here too, we find out that trade liberalisation does matter as Open80s (the 
Sachs–Warner openness measures) enters equation 1 with a correct sign in 17 out of 
18 cases including the ones it is significant for. Similarly Leamer82  (Leamer’s 
measure of trade restrictiveness based on residuals) is significant with regulatory 
quality under specifications 2 and 3 and generally enters equation 1 with a correct 
sign (see table 3: appendix 2).  
Here the significance and correct signs of open80s reinforces the importance 
of the overall trade policy stance, informing us that even if tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers are unimportant at times, the composite trade policy package, especially taxes 
on exports and controls in the foreign exchange market can be crucial in explaining 
per-capita income differences across nations. The Sachs-Warner criteria  defines 
country as open if (i) non-tariff barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade, (ii) 
average tariff rates are less than 40 percent, (iii) the black market premium was less 
than 20 percent during the 1980s, (iv) the economy is not socialist, and (v) the 
government does not control major exports through marketing boards. The rationale 
for combining these indicators into a single dichotomous variable is that they 
represent different ways in which policy makers can close their economy to 
international trade. However, according to the evidence provided by Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000), the Sachs-Warner composite measure (open80) mainly derives its 
strength from the combination of black market premium and the state monopoly of 
exports. A state monopoly on major exports captures cases in which governments tax 
major exports and therefore reduce the level of trade (exports and imports), and the 
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black market premium captures foreign exchange restrictions as a trade barrier. 
Though Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) accepted state monopoly of exports as an 
appropriate proxy of trade restrictiveness, they felt that black market premia was not a 
good choice as it is highly correlated with inflation, the debt/export ratio, wars and 
institutional quality and may simply capture the effect of widespread macroeconomic 
and political crisis. Our IV regression analysis solves the problem of endogeneity of 
black market premia as we have regressed open80s with set of institutional and 
openness instruments. It may, therefore, be that both government monopoly over 
major exports and black market premia are robust proxies of trade restrictiveness.  
Now we turn to institutions and their apparent role in economic development. 
Specification 3 in table 3, which corresponds to the Rodrik et al. (2004) specification, 
supplements their assertion that institutional development is the key to economic 
development as our six institutional proxies have largely been significant when paired 
with any of the openness and trade policy variables under specification 3. But it would 
be interesting to know which institutional concepts matter more in explaining income 
differentials across countries?  
Table 5 shows that regulatory quality is the most important institutional 
definition in determining economic performance as it has one of the highest 
coefficients in nearly all instances. The superiority of regulatory quality is self evident 
because it captures the policy choices which dictate market outcomes. For example, it 
measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as protection of imports, 
control on foreign ownership, obstacles to foreign bidders on public contracts, real 
personal tax as a burden to enterprise, real corporate tax as a disincentive for 
entrepreneurship, the legal framework as an obstacle to competitiveness, customs as 
an impediment to international trade, price controls and competition laws as obstacles 
to competition. The key to development may lie in market friendly regulations 
through which the workings of financial and commercial institutions improve and 
adequate business development takes place amid increased competition. The 
importance of prudential regulation can be judged from the fact that many developing 
countries have done well, despite being run by autocratic states. China and South 
Korea are the prime examples in this regard. Glaeser et al. (2004a, 2004b) suggest that 
China, South Korea and Taiwan witnessed unprecedented increases in their growth 
rates under the reign of one-party dictatorships all due to the promotion of pro-market, 
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pro growth policies, whereby property rights were secured and competition 
encouraged.  
Regulatory quality is followed by government effectiveness as the most 
important institutional proxy. Again, this is expected because government 
effectiveness is very close to regulatory quality in the sense that the former focuses on 
inputs required for the government to be able to produce and implement robust 
policies whereas the later captures these policies itself. ‘Government effectiveness’ 
measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies. In other words, it captures the efficient 
functioning of the government machinery.  
The third most important institutional concept is political stability. It actually 
captures political instability arising from conflict via armed conflict, social unrest, 
politically motivated violence or terrorist threats. Large-scale conflict in the 
contemporary world mainly takes the form of internal wars in developing countries. 
There have been over forty civil war episodes since the end of the cold war. These 
conflicts are a major cause of development failure, contributing to the persistence of 
poverty.   
Political stability is followed by rule of law and control for corruption. ‘Rule 
of Law’ measures respect for societal rules, confidence in the supremacy of law and 
captures the public perception of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, 
the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of 
contracts. In short it accounts for the success of a society in developing an 
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and 
social interactions. On the other hand ‘control for corruption’ measures corruption 
within the legal, financial or economic system, which distorts the competitive 
environment, and reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling 
people to abuse positions of power through bribes, patronage and nepotism.  
‘Voice and accountability’, corresponding to democracy, is the institutional 
proxy which matters least. It captures various aspects of the political process, civil 
liberties and political right and measures the transparency of political, commercial and 
legal institutions. The view of Barro (1996) is that democracy can positively affect 
growth when personal and political freedoms are very weak, but lowers growth when 
some liberties are already in place. This suggests a quadratic relationship between 
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democracy and growth, it is first positive and then negative. Voice and accountability 
may matter less when government effectiveness, regulatory capacity and the rule of 
law are well established and function well. But democracy may be of greater 
importance when these other factors are weak.    
In contrast to our results for specification 3 apropos institutional superiority 
over trade, specifications 1 and 2 which include human capital, tell a different story 
which brings us back to the work of Rodrik el al. (2004). However, they did not take 
into account human capital in their log of per capita income equations and thus their 
analysis may have misspecification biases as can be seen from the very low 
2 R values 
they get for their growth equations. Our analysis includes human capital, which 
significantly improves the explanatory power of the model as can be seen from highly 
significant F statistic and high 
2 R in table 4 (appendix 2). Further more, our study is 
in line with recent cross sectional work on institutions and economic growth, which 
also brings human capital into the picture as an equally important determinant of 
economic development (see Glaeser et al., 2004a). 
In comparison to the findings of Rodrik et al. (2004) regarding the pre-
eminence of institutions over trade, in a better specified model (refer to specifications 
1 and 2 in table 3 and 4: appendix 2), we find that institutional superiority vis-à-vis 
trade policy has diminished. In many instances, institutions enter the per-capita 
equation insignificantly esspecially when human capital is present in equation 1. 
Though institutions always carry right signs if significant, there have been many 
instances when they have entered equation 1 with wrong signs too. For example, in 
table 3, voice and accountability, regulatory quality and control of corruption have the 
wrong (negative) sign whenever they enter the equation with overall non-tariff 
barriers (Ntarfov). Rule of law is insignificant in any combination with the 11 
openness or trade policy variables for specifications 1 and 2, as well as enter with a 
wrong sign in half of the cases. This is an interesting finding in the light of the Rodrik 
et al. (2004) paper, which employed the rule of law as the only proxy for institutions 
and then go on to claim the superiority of institutions over openness. Though we also 
find that institutional superiority is somewhat retained in a per-capita income equation 
which has openness proxies, but with the introduction of trade policy variables the 
superiority of institutions diminishes especially in the case of trade taxes and open 
80s. 
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One reason for getting insignificant values for institutions in specification 1 
and 2 could be because human capital influences economic development by 
improving the working of institutions, as suggested by Lipset (1960) and recently re-
emphasised in Glaeser et al. (2004a and 2004b). Our results support this, as we find 
that human capital is always significant when it enters in equation 1 under 
specifications 1 and 2, taking over from institutions in explaining differences in per 
capita income (table 3).   
To investigate possible complementarities between institutions and human 
capital we would like to further investigate the inter-relationship between human 
capital formation and institutional quality.  To this effect we modify our explanatory 
equation for per-capita income determination in equation (1), by including an 
interaction term, where we interact human capital with six available concepts of 
institutional quality. The object is to determine the impact of human capital on 
institutional development, while at the same time accounting for and solving the 
endogeneity problems in institutions and human capital. 
i i i i i i PK N HK TP N y 2 ) . ( log ε τ ζ + + + + + = D h l   (5)
 
Ni i i i i i i GEO PTR TLEX FR EUR ENG N ∈ + ∂ + + + + + + = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l h ϕ κ δ ψ   (6)
 
Ni i i i i i i GEO PTR TLEX FR EUR ENG TP ∈ + ∂ + + + + + + = 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 l h ϕ κ δ ψ   (7)
 
Ni i i i i i i GEO PTR TLEX FR EUR ENG N HK ∈ + ∂ + + + + + + = 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ) . ( l h ϕ κ δ ψ   (8)
Here   and   are respectively the predicted values for institutions and 
integration, and  is the interaction term where we treat each institutional 
variable as a dummy by assigning a score of 0 for the values which are negative, and 
1 for the values which are positive. The only difference between model 1 and model 4 
is that in the later case human capital enters the per capita difference equation as part 
of the interaction term. Since institutions enter the interaction term in dummy variable 
form,   can be instrumented by TLEX and PTR as can be seen from equation 
8. Table 6 shows the results for equation (5). The results confirm that institutions and 
human capital are significantly related to each other especially for voice and 
i N i TP
) . ( N HK
) . ( N HK
i t
i t
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accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control for 
corruption. 
An important observation from table 6 is that interaction terms 
overwhelmingly carry positive signs. This means that institutions and human capital 
are complements and any improvement in human capital will promote institutional 
quality of the country and vice versa. Here, we can say that human capital is as 
important in explaining per-capita and growth differentials as institutions. This is in 
line with the findings of Glaeser et al. (2004a) who concluded their study with 
following remarks: “the existing research cannot convincingly show that institutions 
rather than human capital have a causal effect on economic growth (p. 41)”.  
In that respect we have somewhat addressed the ‘institutional dilemma’ 
mentioned in Rodrik et al. (2004) as we find that human capital and institutions are 
complements.
4 Thus, if institutional improvement is at the fore of the policy makers’ 




5  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Do institutions dominate international economic integration in explaining 
differences in per-capita income across countries? Clearly, the importance of 
institutions in determining the economic development of a country cannot be 
overemphasised. Institutions, whether the rule of law, voice and accountability, 
political stability, regulatory quality, control of corruption or government 
effectiveness, are all pre-requisites for development and are the catalyst for the 
success of any development strategy. But the fact remains that institutions or 
institutional development is a long term phenomenon, and is not an objective policy 
concept for short term economic strategies to achieve higher economic growth. That is 
why even after finding institutions rule over integration, Rodrik et al. (2004) conclude 
their paper with following lines: “How much guidance do our results provide to policy 
makers who want to improve the performance of their economies? Not much at all. 
Sure, it is helpful to know that geography is not destiny, or that focusing on increasing 
                                                 
4 Institutional superiority fails to have any operational value for policy makers. 
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the economy’s links with world markets is unlikely to yield convergence. But the 
operational guidance that our central result on the primacy of institutional quality 
yields is extremely meagre.” 
Mere institutional superiority has no practical application for policy makers in 
the short run. Since institutions cannot be modified in a short span of time, they may 
be beyond the scope of a lot of policy making. So where do we stand? How can we 
make the importance of institutions more relevant for policy makers by unlocking this 
‘institutional dilemma’? To this effect we have tried to find a close substitute for 
institutions which would also responds to the short term policy time framework. 
According to Glaeser et al. (2004a) the existing research cannot convincingly show 
that institutions rather than human capital have a causal effect on economic growth. 
They provide evidence to suggest that it is human capital which also contributes to 
institutional development and not the other way around. “Ëducation is needed for 
courts to operate and to empower citizens to engage with government institutions. 
Literacy encourages the spread of knowledge about government malfeasance. Social 
connections make it possible to form private groups, which then take on the task of 
challenging the state. According to this view, countries differ ultimately in their 
stocks of human and social capital, and the institutional outcomes depend on this 
endowment (Ibid, 2004:19).” An important message one can extract from their paper 
is that human capital can be a close substitute for institutions, as human capital and 
institutions tend to move together: “All or nearly all high human capital countries are 
stable democracies. All or nearly all low human capital countries are dictatorships, 
with virtually no checks and balances (ibid, 2004a: 41).” 
To summarise, we find that opening up domestic markets to foreign 
competition by revoking trade restrictions and trade barriers can be good for 
economic performance. Secondly, developing human capital is as important as 
superior institutional functioning for economic wellbeing. Indeed, the accumulation of 
human capital stocks via increased education might lead to improved institutional 
functioning, and the utilisation of policies like trade liberalisation. The evidence 
regarding the importance of human capital is clear cut in the growth literature. Indeed 
any country which is currently developed, or any country on the verge of 
development, has first seen significant improvements in human capital. Policies aimed 
at educational improvement yield a double dividend: they improve institutions in the 
longer-run and in the shorter-run they will allow for greater gains to the economy 
  21 
from trade liberalisation. Eventually, superior institutional functioning will lead to 
greater home-grown (endogenous) democracy and make absolute poverty 
unacceptable.  
With regard to the role of international integration versus institutions we have 
found that openness counts for little per se in explaining income differences across 
countries. This is because it is an outcome and not a cause. Trade policies, and 
liberalisation, on the other hand, are not insignificant in explaining cross-country per-
capita income variation. With regard to trade policies we can safely say that the 
overall policy stance, particularly those associated with black market premia in 
foreign exchange markets and export taxes, are most important. The presence of these 
two phenomena is also closely related to poor institutional performance. Tariffs and 
quotas on imports, however, are of secondary importance, indicating that they are less 
growth retarding. 
Finally, a cautionary note on the institutional data (Kaufmann et al., 2002) is 
in order. Much of this data, as Glaeser et al. (2002a and 2002b) argue, are outcome 
variables, except perhaps for the rule of law. In future studies we need to employ 
better indicators of institutional policies.       
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GRAPH B2 
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Appendix 2 
TABLE 1 
Pair wise correlation 
Regressors   LnY 
Lcopen   0.19 
Impnov   0.31 
Tarshov   0.37*** 
Tariffs   -0.51* 
Owti  -0.41* 
Txtrdg  -0.59* 
Totimpov  -0.11 
Owqi  -0.17 
Ntarfov  -0.501* 
Open80   0.49* 
Leamer82   0.68* 
Va   0.69* 
Ps   0.72* 
Ge   0.74* 
Rq   0.63* 
Rl   0.78* 
Ctc   0.75* 
Pk   0.18 
Hk   0.88* 
*, **, *** Bonferroni- Adjusted  











First stage regression results for instrumental variables 
First Stage Results
  lcopen Impnov Tarshov Tariff Owti Txtrg Totimpov Owqi Ntarfov
Lfrkrom  0.524 14.71 21.25   -0.86  -0.152   0.008   -22.8   -0.076   -16.40
  (9.32)*  (8.33)* (6.07)* (-0.53) (-3.33)*  (1.52)    (-3.3)*  (-1.25)  (-1.56)
Engfrac  0.421 12.34  21.98   -3.73   0.03   0.017     30.6   -0.157   11.68
  (2.31)**  (2.37)** (2.13)** (-0.72)  (0.32)  (1.33)      (1.53)  (-1.02)     0.38
Eurfrac -0.115  -3.51  -1.29   -2.40  -0.07  -0.006    -13.66    0.09    -0.07
  (-0.91) (-0.88)  (-0.16) (-0.67) (-0.88) (-0.59)     (-1.16)   (0.85)   (-0.04)
Tlex  0.08   2.44   4.77    0.201   0.007   0.012      -1.94    0.03     7.84
  (3.35)*  (2.34)** (2.31)**   (0.24)  (0.35)  (5.10)*    (-0.67)   (1.23)    (1.78)***
Ptr  0.001   0.02   0.11    0.083   0.0004   0.001     -0.19    0.003     1.45
  (0.43)  (0.20)  (0.42)  (0.72)  (0.15)  (3.94)*    (-0.49)   (0.94)    (2.42)**
  29 
Disteq -0.004  -0.043  -0.105  -0.216  -0.0026  -0.0008      0.08   -0.001    -0.44
  (-0.30) (-0.46) (-0.57) (-2.40)** (-1.32) (-3.05)*     (0.24)  (-0.67)   (-0.80)
N 81 53 53 60 49 34    38   49   38
F 23.1* 19.05  11.71*    3.28*   2.68* 12.5*      2.30*     0.87      1.96
R2   0.65   0.71 0.60    0.27   0.27   0.73      0.30     0.11      0.27
First Stage Results
  Open80s Leamer82 Va Ps Ge Rq Rl Ctc Hk
Lfrkrom   0.124  -0.0349  0.067  0.052   0.102   0.013    0.08   0.134    -0.25
   (0.97) (-0.31) (0.62) (0.46)  (1.07)  (0.14)   (0.85)  (1.32)   (-0.81)
Engfrac  -0.03   0.211  0.75  0.252   0.469   0.175    0.42   0.569      1.28
  (-0.12)  (0.81) (2.04)** (0.68)  (1.49)  (0.56)   (1.29)  (1.69)***     (1.43)
Eurfrac  -0.02  -0.303 0.495  0.296   0.47   0.54    0.247    0.353      0.728
  (-0.09) (-1.52) (2.03)** (1.21)  (2.26)**  (2.67)**   (1.15)   (1.59)     (1.10)
Tlex  -0.018  -0.067  0.0048  0.037   0.029   0.03    0.079    0.092      0.182
  (-0.35) (-1.02) (0.10)  (0.78)  (0.71)  (0.97)   (1.92)**   (2.15)**     (1.26)
Ptr  -0.009  -0.030 -0.0063  -0.013  -0.006  -0.005   -0.012    -0.005     -0.097
  (-1.32) (-3.61)* (-0.84) (-1.7)*** (-1.03) (-0.92)  (-1.8)***   (-0.85)    (-4.58)*
Disteq   0.005   0.006   0.026   0.02   0.02    0.01    0.025    0.0281       0.049
    (1.21)  (1.42) (4.43)* (3.68)*  (4.79)* (1.96)**   (4.70)*   (5.03)*      (2.95)*
N 35 30 79 73 73 78 78 75 58
F 1.88 5.5* 13.1 10.76* 15.6*   6.95* 18.5* 18.23* 20.63*
R2 0.28 0.58   0.52   0.49   0.57   0.37    0.61    0.61 0.70
















Second stage regression results for per capita income under multiple specifications 
Independent 
variables 
Specification Significant  Right sign  Significant and  right 
sign 
OPENNESS 
Lcopen  1  0 out of 6  0 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  0 out of 6  None 
  3  2 out of 6  1 out of 6  1 out of 2 
Impnov  1  0 out of 6  1 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  0 out of 6  None 
  3  3 out of 6  1 out of 6  0 out of 3 
Tarshov  1  0 out of 6  1 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  1 out of 6  None 
  3  2 out of 6  1 out of 6  0 out of 2 
Open80s  1  0 out of 6  6 out of 6  none 
  2  0 out of 6  6 out of 6  none 
  3  1 out of 6  5 out of 6  1 out of 1 
Leamer80s  1  0 out of 6  6 out of 6  none 
  30 
  2  1 out of 6  6 out of 6  1 out of 1 
  3  1 out of 6  2 out of 6  1 out of 1 
TRADE POLICY 
Tariffs  1  0 out of 6  5 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  5 out of 6  None 
  3  0 out of 6  6 out of 6  None 
Owti  1  0 out of 6  2 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  1 out of 6  None 
  3  0 out of 6  3 out of 6  None 
Txtrdg  1  4 out of 6  6 out of 6  4 out of 4 
  2  2 out of 6  6 out of 6  2 out of 2 
  3  2 out of 6  5 out of 6  2 out of 2 
Totimpov  1  0 out of 6  0 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  0 out of 6  None 
  3  2 out of 6  0 out of 6  0 out of 2 
Owqi  1  0 out of 6  0 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  0 out of 6  None 
  3  0 out of 6  2 out of 6  None 
Ntarov  1  0 out of 6  3 out of 6  None 
  2  0 out of 6  4 out of 6  None 
  3  1 out of 6  4 out of 6  1 out of 1 
INSTITUTIONS 
Va  1   1 out of 11    5 out of 11  1 out of 1 
  2   1 out of 11    7 out of 11  1 out of 1 
  3   9 out of 11     10 out of 11  9 out of 9 
Ps  1   0 out of 11    8 out of 11  None 
  2   0 out of 11    8 out of 11  None 
  3     10 out of 11     11 out of 11  10 out of 10 
Ge  1   0 out of 11     10 out of 11  None 
  2   0 out of 11     11 out of 11  None 
  3     10 out of 11     11 out of 11  10 out of 10 
Rq  1   0 out of 11    6 out of 11  None 
  2   0 out of 11    6 out of 11  None 
  3   9 out of 11     11 out of 11  9 out of 9 
Rl  1   0 out of 11    8 out of 11  None 
  2   0 out of 11    8 out of 11  None 
  3   9 out of 11     11 out of 11  9 out of 9 
Ctc  1   0 out of 11    5 out of 11  None 
  2   0 out of 11    4 out of 11  None 
  3   9 out of 11     10 out of 11  9 out of 9 
Hk  1     60 out of 66   66 out of 66  60 out of 60 
  2     60 out of 66   66 out of 66  60 out of 60 
Pk  1       0 out of 66   49 out of 66  None 
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression  
test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993). 
- The table illustrates the results for equation 1 under various general specifications. i.e.,  
specification 1: openness or trade policy + Institutions + Hk +Pk,  Specification 2: openness or trade  
policy + Institutions + Hk, Specification 3: openness or trade policy + Institutions. 
- Note that specification 3 corresponds to the one adopted by Rodrik et al. (2004) for their growth equation. 
  31TABLE 4 
Second stage regression results for Txtrdgª and institutions 







































Txtrdg                              -16.86 -9.61 1.33  -15.11  -9.38 -17.8 -14.68  -8.38 -8.21  -17.61 -9.28 -10.91 -14.72 -9.42 -18.41 -15.56 -9.05 -19.62
                                     
                          
                          
                       
                         
                       
                        
                        
                          
                           
                         
                         
                          
                                
                                
                         
                         
                                 
                                     
                                 
(-1.7)*** (-1.7)*** (0.1) (-2.0)** (-1..9)*** (-1.61) (-1.24) (-1.63) (-0.7) (-1.57) (-1.7)*** (-0.74) (-1.9)*** (-2.1)** (-1.9)*** (-1.8)*** (-1.53) (-2.0)**
Va -0.3508  -0.148  1.25
(-0.44)  (-0.21)  (3.7)*
Ps 0.142  0.0528  0.97 
(0.34)  (0.09)  (3.24)*
Ge 0.122  0.355  1.04
(0.12)  (0.45)  (3.9)*
Rq -0.299  0.058  1.87 
(-0.29)  (0.08)  (2.85)*
Rl 0.205  0.250  0.85
(0.35)  (0.37)  (3.61)* 
Ctc -0.194  -0.108  0.76
(-0.25)  (-0.16)  (3.6)*
Hk 0.4752 0.461 0.313 0.392 0.323 0.286 0.413 0.399 0.283 0.306 0.446 0.46
(1.7)*** (1.9)*** (2.0)***  (1.72)*** (0.97) (1.01) (2.05)** (2.42)** (1.23) (1.08) (1.26) (1.43)
Pk 0.039  0.039 0.032 0.041  0.030  0.038 
(1.12)  (1.13) (0.78) (1.07)  (0.97)  (1.12) 
N 31 32 31 32 31 32 31 32 31 32 31 32
F 17.8* 29.6* 42.5* 26.9* 35.6* 27.9* 25.4* 46.0* 41.4* 18.2* 34.2* 41.4* 29.1* 45.4* 43.9* 19.4* 30.4* 42.5*
R 0.68 0.73 0.65  0.79 0.77 0.51 0.78 0.82 0.67  0.69 0.76 0.67 0.80 0.82 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.66
– t-Values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. 
– Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993). 
– ª Please also refer to table 6, where we give results for equation 5. There also Txtrdg is the most significant variable out of the three selected openness and trade policy variables (i.e., Lcopen,   tariffs 
and Txtrdg). 
32 TABLE 5 
Institutional comparisons 
  va ps ge Rq rl  ctc 
         
Lcopen 1.34  1.55  1.55 2.11 1.40  1.48 
 (10.9)* 
 
(9.7)* (10.9)* (8.7)* (12.4)*  (11.3)* 
Impnov 1.46  1.54  1.56 2.18 1.41  1.47 
 (8.8)* 
 
(8.6)* (9.6)* (8.2)* (11.1)*  (9.9)* 
Tarshov 1.48 1.54 1.57 2.19 1.41  1.47 
 (8.6)* 
 
(8.5)* (9.5)* (8.1)* (10.9)*  (9.8)* 
Tariffs -0.97  0.61  0.33 0.49 0.19  -0.19 
 (-0.1) 
 
(0.6) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2)  (-0.1) 
owti 1.46  1.48  1.71 1.93 1.34  1.49 
 (5.5)* 
 
(5.6)* (5.5)* (4.9)* (6.8)*  (6.1)* 
txtrdg 0.25  0.97  1.04 1.80 0.85  0.76 
 (3.7)* 
 
(3.2)* (3.9)* (2.8)* (3.6)*  (3.6)* 
totimpov 1.91 1.11  2.4 1.54  1.80  2.43 
 (3.5)* 
 
(3.7)* (3.2)* (4.1)* (3.8)*  (3.7)* 
owqi 1.65  1.54  1.64 2.18 1.34  1.49 
 (4.6)* 
 
(6.0)* (5.4)* (5.5)* (6.8)*  (6.1)* 
ntarfov 0.61  1.86  2.60 0.71 0.93  1.18 
 (1.5) 
 
(2.4)** (1.4)  (1.1) (2.1)** (1.8)*** 
Open80s 1.20  1.35  1.36 1.30 0.53  0.60 
 (2.7)* 
 
(1.9)*** (2.5)** (1.8)*** (1.0)  (1.14) 
Leamer82 1.05  1.31  1.21 1.71 1.18  1.01 
 (6.18)*  (3.6)*  (4.6)*  (5.3)* (3.9)*  (4.4)* 
t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
Note: The above table provides IV regression coefficients of institutions under specification 3 of the per-capita  
income equation (eq.1). Note that specification 3, which only employs institutions and openness in order to explain 


















33 TABLE 6 
Interaction between human capital and institutions 
Dependent variable: Log of per capita income 
Independent 
variables   1                                    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
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  N 60 59 59 60 60 59 53 52 52 53 53 52 31 31 31 31 31 31
F 19.1* 21.08 33.6* 38.5* 32.7* 37.6* 15.23* 2.75*
 
19.03* 16.99*  21.4* 18.8* 16.9* 25.1* 39.6* 22.7* 36.4* 29.5*
R2 0.40 0.48 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.72 0.35 - 048 0.40 0.54 0.10 0.68 0.78 0.85 0.75 0.84 0.81
- t- Values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. 
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993). 
- Further regressions were run for equation 5, when Open80s, Owti and Owqi enter equation 1 alternatively as openness or trade policy proxies. The results, especially for interaction terms remain the same 
suggesting strong complementarities between institutions and human capital. However we do not state the results here due to space limitations. 
 Appendix 3 
Variables, definition, year, source and expected impact 
Variables 
 





LnY  Natural logarithm of Per Capita Income at purchasing Power Prices 




Independent variables   
Institutional 
proxies: 
(They comprise of aggregate governance indicators for six 
dimensions of governance covering 175 countries.  Kaufman et al. 
(2002) relied on 194 different measures of governance drawn from 
17 different sources of subjective governance data constructed by 
15 different sources including international organizations, political 
and business risk rating agencies, think tanks and non 
governmental organizations. The governance indicators have been 
oriented so that higher values correspond to better outcomes on a 
scale from -2.5 to 2.5. ) 
 
Va  Voice and Accountability: (i) Does State legitimately represent its 
citizens. (ii) Legal system/ transparency and fairness (iii) Political 
rights (iv) Freedom of speech (v) Business have voice to express 
and they are informed, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. 
(2002) 
positive if >0 
negative if <0 
Ps  Political Stability: (i) Military coup risk (ii) Major insurgency Rebellion 
(iii) Political terrorism (iv) Political Assassination (v) Civil War (vi) 
Major Urban Riot (vii) New government honors commitments of 
previous government Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. (.2002) 
positive if >0 
negative if <0 
Ge Government  Effectiveness : (i) Operation Risk Index : Bureaucratic 
delays (ii) State’s ability to formulate and implement national policy 
initiatives (iii) Effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of 
government revenue (iv) State’s ability to create, deliver and 
maintain vital national infrastructure (v) State’s ability to respond 
effectively to domestic economic problems (vi) Institutional failure: A 
deterioration of government capacity to cope with national problems 
as a result of institutional rigidity or gridlock (vii) Government policy/ 
Pro business orientation (viii) Government decetralisation, 
independent and responsibilities or local and regional governments, 
and legislative and executive transparency (ix) Wasteful government 
expenditutre (x) Public service vulnerability to political pressure (xi) 
Government economic policies are independent of pressure from 
special interest groups (xii) Quality of public health (xiii) quality of 
public education (xiv) quality of central bank,  Year: 1997/98. 
Source: Kaufman et al. (2002) 
positive if >0 
negative if <0 
Rq  Regulatory Quality :  (i) Restrictions on ownership of Business by 
non-residents (ii) Restriction on ownership of equities (iii) Price 
liberalisation (iv) Trade & Foreign exchange system (v) Competition 
Policy (vi) Commercial law effectiveness (vii) Commercial law 
extensiveness (viii) Financial regulations: extensiveness (ix) 
Financial Regulations: effectiveness (x) Large scale privatisation (xi) 
small scale Privatisation (xii) Governance and enterprise 
restructuring (xiii) Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation (xiv) 
Securities market and non bank financial institutions (xv) Bankruptcy 
law (xvi) Minimal administrative regulations that constrain 
businesses (xvii) Wage/ Price Controls, Year: 1997/98. Source: 




positive if >0 
negative if <0 
  




Rl  Rule of Law : (i) Enforceability of contracts (ii) Losses and costs of 
crime (iii) Kidnapping of foreigners (iv) crime (v) Corruption of bank 
officials (vi) Extent of tax evasion (vii) Costs of organised crime for 
business (viii) Police effectiveness in safeguarding personal scurity 
(ix) independence of the juidiciary from interference by the 
government and/or parties to the dispute (x) Private business has 
recourse to independent and impartial courts for challenging the 
legality of government (xi) Financial assets and wealth are well 
protected (xii) Private business are more likely to settle disputes 
outside court (xiii) Concern with level of crome (xiv) Black market 
(xv) Property rights (xvi) Feeling of personal safety (xvii) Equal 
opportunities to access justice (xviii)Equality before the law (xix) 
Courts – fair and impartial (xx) courts- affordable (xxi) Courts- 
consistent (xxii) Court’s enforceability (xxiii) Confidence in judicial 
system today in insuring property rights (xxiv) General constraint- 
functioning of judiciary (xxv) Obstacles to competition-violation of 
patents (xxvi) quality of courts (xxvii) Parallel economy as obstacle 
to business development  Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al. 
(2002) 
positive if >0 
negative if <0 
Ctc  Control for Corruption: Improper practices in the public sphere (ii) 
Frequency of additional payments (iii) Dishonest courts (iv) 
Corruption as obstacle to business (v) Bribery (% of Gross 
Revenues) (vi) State Capture (BPS) (vii) Percent of public officials 
viewed to be corrupt (viii) Percent who believe the government is 
corrupt (ix) Additional Payments: bureaucracy (x) Additional 
payments: judiciary (xi) Severity of corruption within the state (xii) 
Political risk index: Internal causes of political risk: Mentality, 
including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness 
to compromise, etc Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al.  (2002) 
positive if >0 
negative if <0 
 Openness :  
 
(They are general openness indicators which are the outcome 
based measures of the extent a country is open to international 




Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of 
(nominal) imports plus exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 
1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6. 
positive 
Impnov  Overall import penetration, Year: 1985, Source: Rose (2002)  positive 
Tarshov  Overall trade penetration derived from the World Bank’s TARS 
system, Year: 1985, Source: Rose (2002) 
positive 
Open80s  Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness indicator. The 
Sachs-Warner criteria defines country as open if (i) non tariff 
barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade, (ii) average tariff rates 
are less than 40 percent, (iii) the black market premium was less 
than 20 percent during the 1980s, (iv) the economy is not socialist, 
and (v) the government does not control major exports through 
marketing boards, Year: 1980, Source: Rose (2002). 
positive 
Leamer82  Leamer’s measure of openness based on residuals capturing 
deviations of actual trade from trade as predicted by an empirical 
factor proportions model of trade to measure trade policy, Year: 
1980, Source: Rose (2002).  
positive  
Trade Policy:   (Trade policy comprises of various forms of tariffs and non tariff 
barriers to control the level of trade with other countries and direct 
measures of trade policy.) 
 
tariffs  Import duties as a percentage of imports, Year: 1985, Source World 




Measure of own-import weighted tariff rates on intermediate inputs 
and capital goods constructed from UNCTAD data , Year: 1985, 
Source: Barro and Lee data set 
negative 
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Variables 
 






Total revenue from taxes on international trade as a proportion of 
total trade, Year: 1982, Source: Rose(2002)  
negative 
Totimpov  Overall weighted average total import charges, Year: 1985, Source: 
Rose(2002) 
negative 
Owqi  Own-import weighted non-tariff frequency on intermediate inputs 
and capital goods derived from UNCTAD sources, Year: 1985, 
Source: Rose (2002) 
negative 
Ntarfov:    Overall non tariff barrier coverage, year: 1987, Source: Rose (2002)  negative 
Other exogenous variables:   
Hk  Average Schooling Years in the total Population at 25, Year: 1999,  
Source: Barro and Lee data set 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html
positive 
Pk  Gross capital formation as a Percentage of GDP, Year: 2000, 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 
positive 






Lfrkrom  Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following 
Frankel and Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure 
geography’ variables. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999). 
 
positive 
Engfrac  Fraction of te population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
 positive 
Eurfrac  Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of 
Western Europe: English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. 
Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
positive 
Tlex  Public spending on education, total (as a percentage of GDP), Year: 
1999, Source WDI( 2002) 
positive 




Disteq  Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90.  
Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
 
Depends as it 
is a common 
instrument 
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